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African Identities: Pan-Africanism
in the Era of Globalization and
Capitalist Fundamentalism
Ngugi wa Thiong’o

I.

W

e live in a world of contradictions. Human technology and
ingenuity have opened an endless frontier in outer space and internal
space, even decoding the key to life; and yet human greed has decreed
that there be poverty and disease on earth. The means to save life are
overshadowed by the means to destroy it. Weapons of mass destruction, no matter what nation hoards them, are a sword of Damocles
over the globe. Insecurity haunts the streets of even the most heavily
armed nations. The prison population is the most rapidly growing sector in both the poorest and the wealthiest of nations. The splendor-insqualor character of our globe is at the heart of the complex
contradictions of globalization. What is Africa’s place in this scenario?
What is Africa’s place in global space?
Every phenomenon in nature, society, and thought, including the
character of its being, is affected by the external and internal dynamics
of its becoming. African development is no exception. The Cold War of
superpower rivalries affected the character of the postcolonial state
that emerged in the Africa of the Sixties in the 20th century. The military and civilian dictatorships, while feeding on the fertile soil of weak
democratic and economic bases within, were also a function of superpower rivalries, with African regions often fighting proxy wars that
provided nothing more than killing fields to test the effectiveness of
rival armaments. The struggles for democracy by a broad social movement and the end of the Cold War saw the liberalization of the internal
space, with African leaders retiring (instead of being retired by death
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through old age or military coups). These are positive internal developments. But just as decolonization took place under the international
conditions of the Cold War, which left its mark, these post-Cold War
developments are taking place under conditions of intensified economic
globalization.
Not that globalization is a new phenomenon. It has been a feature of
capital since its genesis in the 16th century as a challenge and later a
replacement to feudalism as the dominant and determining force in
social production. Explorations and colonial ventures are concomitant
with its genesis. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels predict
the worldwide character of its development when they talk of the
bourgeoisie, through its exploitation of the world market, giving a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.
They talk of old established national industries being dislodged by
industries utilizing raw materials drawn from the remotest zones —
industries whose products are consumed not only at home, but in
every quarter of the globe.1 Africa has always been an integral part of
the key moments in the evolution of the globalizing tendency of capital, though disadvantageously so. Once again, we turn to Marx who
observed that: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the
uprooting, enslavement and entombment in the mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East
Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercialized
hunting of black skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist
production.”2 The “rosy dawn” was the mercantile phase of capital
that fueled the slave trade and created slave plantations. Here the
African body is turned into a commodity. The industrial phase of the
19th century fueled the scramble for colonies as sources of raw materials and markets for finished goods. Now the raw material is turned
into a commodity whose cheap price becomes the heavy artillery forcing capitulation to the capitalist order. The phase of finance capital
then follows when money that previously enabled exchange becomes
itself a commodity of the highest order, a laser-guided missile that
speeds up capitulation and crumbles the protective walls of nations.
Both Lenin, in his book Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, published at the beginning of the First World War, and the Bretton Woods
Agreement at the end of the Second World War, which led to the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),3 foresaw the
coming global dominance of finance capital. The very titles of these
22
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Bretton Woods institutions signal the globe as the theater for the
actions of finance capital.
Globalization today, then, is the maturing of a tendency and process
inherent in capitalism. But if globalization has been the tendency and
context of the process of capitalist modernity, there is a difference
between its pre-Cold War and its post-Cold War manifestations. The
earlier phases and forms assumed (or at least paid homage to) the
notion of laissez-faire, of free competition. There were different paths
toward the capitalist paradise. What characterizes globalization in its
current form is the ideological and practical imperative of capitalist
fundamentalism. Fundamentalism — economic, political, or religious
— is essentially an insistence that there is only one way of organizing
reality. Margaret Thatcher’s often cited phrase There Is No Alternative
(TINA)4 best illustrates this in relation to politics and economy, but it
embodies the same reductionism in religious fundamentalism. This
capitalist fundamentalism, what some scholars dub neoliberalism,
begins, roughly, with the Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl era, though the
threesome did not create it. It literally calls for the worship of the market, with the common credo of privatization: Privatize or perish, it
says. If a nation deviates from the ordained path, for instance by questioning the disciplinary mechanisms of “aid” conditionality or failing
to privatize public enterprises and introduce narrowly defined forms
of liberal democracy, then it faces excommunication from the global
capitalist temple and expulsion into purgatory. Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania of the 1980s was brought to its knees for questioning neoliberal
doctrine. Even previously compliant dictators were not immune from
punishment when they tried to retain parastatals, their previous
sources of looting and patronage.5 This radical turn conceptualizes
capitalism as a religious system, with the market as the god-like mediator6 in the conflicting claims of its adherents. Unfortunately, it has real
consequences for the political economies of peripheral capitalist societies like those in Africa. For one, these states and their internal policies are under constant surveillance for any deviation from the now
sanctified conditionalities. The surveillance is also manifested at the
international level in the clearly discriminatory policies of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to GATT, especially in the
area of agrarian subsidies.7 This has adverse effects on the farmer
already experiencing social and economic dislocations wrought by the
fundamentalist demands for the commodification of public social
goods, among them, education, health, and water.
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With the insistence that there is only one way of organizing an economy, even capitalism itself, capitalist fundamentalism is already challenging the traditional attributes of the nation-state, such as its
assumed right to formulate national economic policies. Many Third
World policies are made by the IMF. In some cases, the IMF has offices
in the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning, sometimes even
having a say in the appointment of key civil servants as overseers of
the national treasury. A state that has to have its economic policies
approved by another has already surrendered some of its sovereignty
to the approving overseer. Rapid developments in information technology, with the Internet literally drawing the world into one web, further erode the nation-state’s control of what is within its territory, for
no state can now effectively contain the flow and exchange of information across national borders. Even the state’s role as the provider for
social needs and the employer of intellectuals has been usurped, this
time by the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the secular
missionaries8 in the era of globalization. Many products of national
universities compete for consultancy with the NGOs. These NGOS are
funded by the treasuries of foreign governments, mostly Western,9 and
so they are NGOs only to the Third World states. Otherwise, they are
an arm of the foreign policy of the bankrolling states. The products of
the hard work of these native consultants, even the language in which
the critiques they write are couched, are often within the broad consensus of the sources of funds. A native-based NGO that may call for
the overthrow of a corrupt regime or call on the nation-state to challenge capitalist fundamentalism will quickly find that its funding has
dwindled overnight. He who pays the piper calls the tune.
The ascendancy of finance capital affects other areas of our social
life, such as the conception of politics and specifically democracy.
Thus, what is often touted as “freedom” is essentially the freedom of
finance capital to go in and out of national boundaries without the
interference of the nation-state. But does that mean that this capital is
genuinely super-national? Are we talking of a homeless capital? Not
really, for, while claiming the globe as its playground, its base is still in
the national homelands of what largely goes under the name of the
West, mainly its Euro-American sector. It may roam the globe bringing
down the walls of other nation-states but it knows where to return
with its profits. The result of this process for Africa and many Third
World countries around the globe is a state too weak to interfere with
the operation of finance capital but strong enough to contain the popu24
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lation should they rise up against the ensuing social depredations.
Often, these states compete among themselves to prove which is best
able to deliver a cheap, submissive labor force and to protect Free
Trade Zones that are off limits for the laws of the country.10 Instability
is inherent in that situation. In order to create even a modicum of stability, such a postcolonial state will rely on police boots and military
bayonets—a return, ironically, to the character of the postcolonial state
during the Cold War. Thus, the emerging post-Cold War state, with its
democratic robes, is being turned into its opposite, a policing state that
has lost the capacity and the means to speak for the nation. In acting as
an overseer of foreign finance capital, the postcolonial state’s hold on
the allegiance of the population is weakened considerably. The citizens
view it with suspicion, as an enemy of the people (which it often is),
and their gratitude to NGOs may make them see imperialist nations as
their allies against the repressive practices of their own state. The irony
is, of course, that the generous NGOs and the local state—rivals for the
gratitude and allegiance of the people — are armed by the same Western sources. The state is armed with weapons, and the NGO with
coupons.
The policing aspects of the peripheral nation-state will become more
pronounced as the social consequences of unregulated market rule
heighten the contradictions in a world divided into a minority of
wealthy nations, mostly Euro-American, and a majority of poor
nations, mostly Asian, African, and South American. And within this
global dichotomy, all nations are divided into a very wealthy upper
social stratum, the haves, and a poor social majority, the have-nots.
The two gaps of wealth and poverty between and within nations,
rooted in the economic practice of globalization, are rapidly widening,
and herein lies the great paradox of our time. Production is clearly
global but the appropriation and disposal of the product is private. Privatization, then, does not refer to production, for production has become social
and global. Instead, it refers to the accrual of profit. Socialize production,
privatize the produce. Public hands propose, private fingers dispose.
Globalize production, regionalize profiteering. This adds to the paradox. Despite the enormous power of new technologies brought forth
by the globalization of the division of labor, we see the globalization of
poverty. Nurture, which could tame the vicissitudes of nature, breeds
greater social vicissitudes. The deepening discrepancy between the
have and have-not conditions of an increasingly globalized world is a
foundation for new types of authoritarianism.11 The instability may
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also generate more fundamentalisms in alliance12 or in opposition to
capitalist fundamentalism.
II.
Unfortunately, Africa fares the worst, despite or because of the fact
that Africa has always been a player in the development of the modern
capitalist world. Under the slave trade, the African body is commodified. Under the slave plantation system, Africa supplies unpaid labor
that works the sugar and cotton fields. Under colonialism, Africa supplies raw materials — gold, diamonds, copper, uranium, coffee, cocoa
—without having control over the prices.13 Under the new global situation of debts, debt servicing, and conditionalities, Africa becomes a net
exporter of the very capital it most needs. Africa, the largest continent
on the globe, endowed with all the resources of nature, becomes the
land most bowed down by the man-wrought ills of poverty, disease,
and ignorance.
How does Africa get itself out of this quagmire and transform into
an equal player in the world, an equal giver and an equal recipient?
How can it relate to other regions on the basis of equality and mutual
respect? Given the fact that the globe is one and its resources are not
endlessly renewable, how does Africa obtain its fair share of the common globe?
First, Africa must reject seduction into slumber by the Western selfimage of an endlessly generous and patient donor. Indeed, Africa has
to stop acting the grateful beggar to the West and demand its fair
share. The present state of the continent can be blamed on the West.
One need only catalogue the ills the West has done to Africa to see that
such blame has its basis in solid historical facts. We cannot lay back
and wait for the West to realize the harm it has done and repent. Do
we really expect that the capitalist West, under the slave system and
under the colonial system, could have behaved differently? Now,
under the current wave of globalization, will the West come forward
and kneel down before Africa and say: “We have wronged you, we
have stolen from you; forgive us our trespasses, and, by the way, here
are reparations, a token of our repentance”? No, Africa must not let the
West off the “moral hook.” The continent must heighten its demands
for global social justice and the rectification of glaring historical injustices like the slave trade and colonialism. The West must be made to
accept its responsibility for crimes against African humanity. Frederick
26
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Douglass once said that power concedes nothing without demand. It
never has and it never will. This is true of power within a nation and
among nations. Our own history tells us that every gain, and there
have been many, has been as a result of our struggles. Freedom from
slavery and colonialism was not given to Africa on a silver platter. It
was a result of resistance, a result of demand.
But here is another irony: Demands that have a chance of winning
cannot be made from a position of weakness. Power has never conceded to weakness. Africa must not wait to get itself out of the quagmire through reparations by the very forces that gain from its weak
position. Nor can Africa afford to sit back and blame. Instead, Africa
has to lift itself into power.
The starting point must be a thorough self-examination. While conceding that the way out of its historical nightmare is beset with major
structural obstacles, Africa must be proactive even within its marginality in the global capitalist system. Although not under conditions of its
own choice, Africa must continue to write its own history. Even under
the current relentless drive of capitalist fundamentalism, Africa must
seize back its agency. Not to do so would be to surrender to the fatalism inherent in Western “TINAism,” and a major dishonor to Africa’s
collective memory of resistance in all the previous phases of globalization.
Taking stock of its own weaknesses and strengths should be the
beginning of any proactivism. A struggle that does not inventory what
it can do for itself, and then rely on that as its starting base, is doomed
to fail. If Africa were to examine its history seriously, the continent
could learn useful lessons for the present. The most successful struggles, including those of the Haitian Africans in 1789 and the Mau Mau
in the Kenya of the 1950s, were those based on self-reliance and a belief
in their capacity to change the world. However weak it may now
appear to itself, Africa has to take Nyerere’s credo of self-reliance seriously. A belief in self is the beginning of strength.
The self-examination must begin with a serious questioning of the
problematic relationship of the national middle class to the imperialist
bourgeoisie, on one hand, and to the people, on the other. In The
Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon describes this relationship as the
location of Africa’s weakness and strength. It all depends on which
relationship is dominant.
Frantz Fanon sees the national bourgeoisie that leads the anti-colonial resistance and obtains power as an underdeveloped middle class
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with no economic muscle, counting neither financiers nor industrialists among its ranks. It is not engaged in production, invention, building, or labor. It is completely canalized into activities of the
intermediary type. It has no arms, no guns, no armored vehicles. But
whence, in the colonial era, does it get the power to challenge the
armed might of the colonial state? It is only through its relationship
with the people. It organizes the working people. It works with their
dreams for better wages, better returns for their crops, adequate
schools, affordable houses, and healthy bodies. Indeed, it facilitates
their dreams for the power to change the conditions of their lives. The
nationalist middle class puts its resources — its knowledge of the
world, books, and ideas — at the disposal of the struggle. In the South
Africa of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the ideas of Booker T.
Washington, W. E. B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Karl Marx, and even
those emanating from different religious movements (the idea of independent churches, for instance) were being debated seriously, with the
intellectuals, through newspapers and books, trying to pass on the
ideas to the people in their own languages. In the Kenya of the 1920s,
the intellectuals who came across Garvey’s Negro Digest (now known
as The Black Man) shared what they read with those who could not
access it. This intellectual class is in an organic relationship with the
masses. At the national territorial level, it comes up with visions of
national unity against the divide-and-rule tactics of the colonial
regime. At the continental level, it comes up with a vision of PanAfricanism that embraces not only those who live on the continent, but
also those in diaspora (and it discounts the colonial game of dividing
Africa into sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa or else into regions
whose identity is derived from the influence of major European powers). At the international level, the anti-colonial struggle is consistent
in its characterization of the enemy as the imperialist class, the international class that owns the mines and plantations, along with the manufacturers and bankers — in other words, the class that gains from the
miserable conditions of the poor. The intellectual classes are armed
with a sense of themselves and their place in history. They are armed
with a vision. They are the power base of the successful anti-colonial
resistance against imperialism. You would think that this relationship
would be the rock bottom foundation of the postcolonial state. But this
is not how things work out.
When the nationalist middle class takes over the state, it changes its
relationship with the people. Basically, it refuses to see that its power
28
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does not come from its ownership of the levers of the economy,
because it simply does not own them. They are still owned by the
international bourgeoisie. But the nationalist middle class begins to
behave as if its new power comes from its cozy relationship with imperialism. Fanon argues, in the brilliant chapter titled, “The Pitfalls of
National Consciousness,” that its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation: “it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission
line between the nation and a capitalism,”14 under the mask of neocolonialism. Even in the days when nationalization was a magic word,
according to Fanon, this class only nationalized and normalized the
unfair advantages that are a legacy of the colonial period.
The economic consequences are dire. Even more so is the political
fallout, with the consciousness that had risen to visions of national
unity, African unity, and Pan-Africanism now becoming regionalized
and eventually vulgarized into myopic ethnic and clan horizons. There
is the birth of the one-party state and the supreme leader, and, of
course, the inevitable military dictatorships tolerated (and in some
cases initiated) by the West in the era of the Cold War. The widest
vision beyond the leader’s personal self-aggrandizement is the ethnic.
Often the leader surrounds himself with cronies and sycophants, be
they from his village or other regions. His reception by Western leaders, with the inevitable patting on the back for being a faithful ally,
becomes its own reward. The military vote and the armed nod from
the West—and not the people—are all he needs to maintain power.
In a broader sense, the leader — be he a military or civilian dictator
— is representative of the middle class as a whole15 when it comes to
turning his back on the people. The middle class, partially or wholly, is
soon able to forget that the location of its power is among the people.
This is because, through education and language, its memory has
become integrated with that of the European bourgeois. It is not hard
to see why. The education of the black elite is all in European languages. Their conceptualization of the world is within the parameters
of the language of their inheritance. Most importantly, it makes the
elite an integral part of a given global speech community. Within the
nation, the European language continues to be what it was during the
colonial period: the language of power, conception, and articulation of
the worlds of science, technology, politics, law, commerce, administration, and even culture. The nation becomes divided into two: the tiniest group cuts across the various ethnic boundaries but is in the
privileged linguistic loop; the other group, the majority, is outside the
29
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loop in every possible way. Frantz Fanon touches on this problem in
Black Skin, White Masks when he claims that to acquire a language is to
acquire a world. The weight of the civilization is carried by that language. By cutting across the various ethnicities, the language may
seem to be more national. The tiny group that speaks it is drawn from
the top five percent in each of the ethnic nationalities but may come to
see itself as somehow constituting the nation. Fanon does not directly
cite the incorporation into the European memory as a weakness of the
middle class before and after independence, but he assumes it when he
accuses the national bourgeoisie of identifying itself with the Western
bourgeoisie from whom “it has learnt its lessons.”16
III.
The linguistic incorporation of the African elite into the European
memory has dire consequences for Africa, the most obvious being the
almost universal acceptance by educated Africans that English,
French, and Portuguese are the proper languages for producing and
storing knowledge and information. This has meant that the masses,
the social agency of change, are being denied access to the knowledge
and information they most need to change the world. Trickle-down
economics, so beloved by capitalist fundamentalists, becomes reflected
in trickle-down education and information. I have talked a great deal
about this problem in my books Decolonising the Mind and Penpoints,
Gunpoints and Dreams, and the more I look into the situation, the more I
feel that the linguistic incorporation of the African educated elite into
the European bourgeois memory is an active contributor to Africa’s
backwardness. In that sense every educated African who remains
doggedly locked within the linguistic walls of European languages,
irrespective of his avowed social vision (of the right or left), is part of
the problem and not the solution. European memory sits like a dead
weight on the self-imagination of Africa, and it prevents the elite, even
the most radical, from connecting itself to what Fanon describes as the
revolutionary capital,17 which is the people. More than anything else, it
is this that prevents us from thinking of alternatives outside the Western hegemonic economic-political-cultural matrix.
Take the instance of the elite clinging to Europe’s conceptualization
of the nation-state. In pre-capitalist times, the world was largely without protected borders over which it was a crime to cross. Borders were
often the meeting point of mutual exchange and, in some cases, the site
30
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of intellectual and cultural cross currents. Borders united more than
they divided. The nation-state, the form into which capitalist modernity organized its power, was born with notions of ownership in general and of territory in particular. The birth of the European
nation-state, the slave plantation, and the colony and prison are simultaneous products of the same moment in history. It is not surprising
that these institutions have similar features. The primary one is that of
an enclosed space, often with a single point of entry and exit. They are
gated spaces with a supervising authority. Like all such spaces, the
gate is guarded all the time. You cannot enter or even exit without the
approval of the all-seeing centralized authority. The comings and
goings are recorded. The border now becomes a wall, marking separation of those within and those without. The plantation, the colony, the
prison, and the nation-state mimic and anticipate each other in additional ways as well. The slave plantation is reminiscent of the enclosure movement in England where peasants were hounded out of
common lands to become reservoirs of labor in congested towns.18
Those who turned to stealing sheep as a means of livelihood were
hanged. But later they were exported to colonies-as-prisons. A good
number of colonies, including Australia and Angola, doubled as penal
territories. It is not surprising, for instance, that in France the Minister
for Prisons was also in charge of colonies.19 The nation-state is built on
division and separation and central control, with the prison playing an
increasing role in its exercise of power. Today, some countries have
prison populations that could constitute a separate nation.
The European nation-state created what Césaire, in his Discourse on
Colonialism, sees as the intractable problem of the proletariat within its
own borders and of the colony outside its borders. The colonial state
was a creation of the European nation-state. Remaining subject to the
mother country, it was not, as such, an independent entity in international relations. It acted more like a police and military force of occupation on behalf of the mother state. But in form, it was a mimicry of the
European nation-state and was itself constructed on the contradictory
practices of enclosure (the plantation), integration, and separation. The
most significant division of Africa was into spheres of influence and
control by the European powers that met in Berlin in 1884. The divisions and boundaries were most arbitrary, often combining different
nations while dividing other nations into splinter entities under different powers. The Somali nation is the best example of a people who
shared a common territory, language, culture, and history being split
31

Macalester International

Vol. 14

five ways—into French Djibouti, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, British Kenya, and feudal Ethiopia. The story is the same
throughout the continent. Colonial boundaries were both arbitrary and
divisive. Within the colony, the colonial state dispossessed the former
land-owning, independent, and communal farmers whom, in historical imitation of the English Enclosure Movement of the 18th century, it
hounded into towns to create a reservoir of labor. The colonial state
survived challenge after challenge from the dispossessed and the new
proletariat by ensuring that the communities within its territorial
boundary remained divided on ethnic lines. Thus, for instance, in
Kenya between 1922 and 1960 (to literally two years before independence), Africans were not allowed to form political unions that encompassed the territory as a whole. The colonial state also thrived on the
cooptation of a nascent middle class into an alliance of convenience.
The army, the police, and the prisons worked together to maintain the
colonial state against a restive population; otherwise why would
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (all British states) need to have different
territorial armies? The same is true for Malawi as Nyasaland and the
two British Rhodesias! The postcolonial African independent state was
simply a nationalization of the colonial state, with the inherited territorial boundaries now sanctified by necessity and, more significantly, by
the inability of the new classes in power to imagine a different form of
the state. Among all the emergent postcolonial leaders, it was only
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere who talked of the limitations of
their nation-states, and of union with other African states. Otherwise,
African identities as nations were mapped, marked, and named for
Africa by European nation-states, the former colonial overlords.
Yet Africans need only take a cursory glance at their history to see
that the most successful moments in their struggles were those that
challenged the way they were defined and grouped by European colonizing memory. Pan-Africanism is the best example. Initially imagined
by diasporan African intellectuals and fertilized by additions from
continental Africans, this vision was a creative response to European
divisions of Africa. “Africa for the Africans at home and abroad,” cried
Marcus Garvey. W. E. B. Dubois, C. L. R. James, Kwame Nkrumah,
George Padmore, and a whole range of others imagined a united
Africa that would be the base for all black peoples. They envisioned an
Africa without internal borders, an Africa playing its legitimate role in
the community of nations. The pinnacle of this vision was the Fifth
Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England in 1945, a conference
32
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that resulted in the return to Africa of leaders like Kwame Nkrumah
and Jomo Kenyatta with renewed vigor and energy. Africa Must Unite,
penned by Kwame Nkrumah, declared that the independence of
Ghana in 1957 was meaningless without the liberation of the entire
continent. Europe laughed at him, even mocked him. But look at the
reversal of the situation. The Europeans that used to decry calls for
Pan-Africanist unity and an African Union government are the ones
who are now uniting as the European Union, with a common parliament, a common currency, and freedom of movement across the borders. A united Europe will obviously be in a stronger position to
obtain a better share of the resources of a globalized world. But we in
Africa, sold on the outmoded European concept of the nation-state,
have retreated from the Pan-African vision that got us the few gains
we have. Instead, we retreat back into our national borders—and even
these are further disintegrating into ethnic and clan states. Thus, we
weaken ourselves when others are strengthening themselves.
It is clear that if Africa is to get out of the quagmire and make
progress, the African elite must return to its real base: The People. An
authentic middle class in an underdeveloped country, wrote Frantz
Fanon, should repudiate its colonially fated role as the tool of capitalism, “and make itself the willing slave of that revolutionary capital
which is the people.” Such a class, he continues, ought to “put at the
people’s disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has
snatched when going through the colonial universities.”20 This repudiation would mean nothing less than the intellectual faction of the middle class, the African intelligentsia, disentangling itself from the
European memory by rejecting the notion that European languages are
the only legitimate means of organizing and articulating reality and
dreams. They should not become prisoners of their very success at
snatching knowledge in universities at home and abroad. The retrieval
and use of African languages is of paramount importance. No people
can abandon their language and make much headway. Is it not a blot
on the self-esteem of a whole continent that up until now, outside of
Ethiopia, not a single treaty exists between Africa and the outside
world in an African language? Instead of following the challenge of
such a choice, the African intelligentsia as a whole has surrendered,
without even an attempt at resistance, before what it sees as insurmountable hurdles. It “disappears with its soul set at peace”21 into the
comfort zone of European languages. The dreams of Africa remain
swaddled in European sounds, inaccessible to African peoples. The
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abandonment of the people by its intellectuals, for whom the people
have endured hardships in order to get them educated — with the
expectation of fruitful returns — is the real triumph of colonialism and
a dishonor to the broader African intelligentsia.
Fortunately, there have always been a few intellectuals who have
refused to abdicate, and have kept the issue alive. In Ethiopia, there
has always been intellectual production in African languages. The 19th
and early 20th century Xhosa and Zulu intellectuals debated the best
language of African modernity; some, like Mqayi and Vilikazi, standing firmly for African languages. This advocacy is continued in the
work of Cheikh Anta Diop and Obi Wali. Currently, there are signs
that African intellectuals are beginning to think seriously about the call
for African languages, as expressed, for example, in the work of Kwesi
Kwaa Prah. The Center for the Study of African Cultures, based in
Cape Town, has become an important advocate for the centrality of
African languages. In Kenya, a similar center for the advancement of
African languages is in the making. Some governments, notably South
Africa and Eritrea, have tried to come up with enlightened policies on
African languages. In so many ways, the conference on literature and
knowledge in African languages, held in Eritrea at the beginning of the
year 2000, was a turning point. The conference came up with the
Asmara Declaration, which called on African languages to take on the
duty, the responsibility, and the challenge of speaking for the continent. This was really a call for Africa to reconnect with its memory and
to engage with the world from its base. The Ten Points22 are a manifesto of the only means by which the African intelligentsia can heed
Fanon’s call to place its intellectual production at the people’s disposal
and hence connect itself with the revolutionary capital, the people.
This is a basic step in Africa’s search for a way out of the global quagmire: to arm our people with the knowledge and information that
make them better equipped to effectively demand their rightful share
of the globe.
It is also clear that we have to heed, as a matter of urgency,
Nkrumah’s call that “Africa Must Unite.” Africa cannot be split into
tiny political and economic units and command its share of the globe.
But aren’t the two proposals a contradiction? Can an Africa of many
languages and cultural tendencies unite?
The perception of an irresolvable contradiction persists because of
the assumption that monolingualism is the sine qua non of modernity.
This also leads to the historical fiction of other societies being marked
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by monoculturalism. If we think broadly and historically, then we can
see that this is not really the case. Even Europe has many languages
(100, at least). And if we count the ones brought in by recent immigrants, then we are talking of hundreds of languages and autonomous
dialects. The United States, with its fifty states, has more languages,
religions, and ethnicities than any other territorial nation-state in the
world. The official posture may be that of a linguistic melting pot, but
the reality on the ground speaks otherwise. In Canada, the language
question continues. The existence of many languages is not a particularly African problem. I am not even sure if it is a problem at all. Still,
the assumption persists that many languages are incompatible with
unity and a continental African identity. It was this that made Cheikh
Anta Diop, in 1948, respond to “the objection, usually raised, that
Africans can never have linguistic unity,” with the dismissive rejoinder,“Africa does not need such linguistic unity any more than Europe
does.” He continues:
But it is absolutely false to think that this apparent multiplicity of languages is a serious impediment to the establishment of an indigenous
culture. In fact, among the well over six hundred languages being cited,
there are just about four which are major languages, the others being
merely variants spoken by a small group like regional European dialects
. . . . Therefore there are in Africa . . . only four languages capable of being
developed to become instruments for the expression of the entire
African thought. And this only requires will-power, firmness and determination on the part of Africans to liberate themselves intellectually and
morally.23

It is not necessary to argue that there are only four main languages in
order to make the point that the multiplicity of languages is not a barrier to development. We have to admit that in each African country
there are many nationalities and languages, and accept that reality as
the starting point. Then we must pose different questions: How can the
many languages be used to bring about the unity of African peoples
within a country and within the continent?
Enriching our languages and encouraging dialogue among them
through the tool of translation is the best way to create a cultural basis
for African unity.24 Imagine if all the books written in different African
languages, and even those produced by continental and diasporan
Africans in any language, were available in each and every African
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language? Would this not create a sense of common inheritance and a
basis for more intellectual production? If an inter-ethnic, inter-regional
continental language should emerge (but not on the graveyard of other
languages), that would be a gain for Africa, and it would add another
dimension to the conversation among African languages.
We should not look at a united Africa as a union of African heads of
state but as a union of the African peoples. The struggle and the
process are not the sole business of heads of state but of the entire
African peoples, with their varied languages and cultures. If we put
people first, then we can see the damage being done by colonial
boundaries that perpetuate European memory as the basis for the definition of our being. Driven by this “people awareness,” we should
look at the colonial borders and ask different questions. In so doing,
we turn what is seemingly a weakness into a strength. We can turn the
division of peoples of the same language and culture, but who span
different borders, into a strength by viewing those peoples as a shared
community. In nearly all African states, there are people of the same
language, culture, and history on either side of a border — what are
called border communities. For instance, if Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti,
and Somalia itself were to see the Somali people as a shared community, then uniting Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia would not be a union
of cultural strangers. We could thus use the notion of a shared community as links in a chain for African unity from the Cape to Cairo, from
Kenya to Liberia. A good number of border communities have a common spiritual leader and, in reality, they do not recognize the colonial
boundaries that divide them. In their cultural practices, they are challenging the colonially derived nation-state. Again, should we not use
these communities, with their common spiritual authority and history,
to unite us, instead of criminalizing their border crossings? In short,
we should truly imagine an internally borderless continent. We would
turn the borders into highways for the movement of goods, services,
and ideas across the continent. Then will come to fruition the visions of
our foreparents who saw the continent as a material and spiritual
home for Africans at home and abroad.
IV.
A borderless Africa, or rather one where the national states have
mutated into a continental federal state, cannot be brought about by
force. The process of its becoming, in fact, assumes that democracy, in
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the Lincolnian sense of the “rule of the people, by the people, for the
people,” is the driving force. The alternative is raw force, which would
not bring about political integration but disintegration through border
wars. Continental unity, for it to be real, must be voluntary and people
driven. Africa must, however, not assimilate all aspects of Western
forms of democracy. Democracy in the West has become less about the
society people want to build than about holding elections every four
years or so. Elections are important, of course, but they should be part
of the overall search for a just society. In this sense, there has always
been a major flaw in the Western democratic tradition, from ancient
Athens to America today. The Athenian democracy was based on the
division of society into free men and slaves and women. Democracy
was for the free citizen. Democracy as exercised by colonial powers
assumed freedom at home and colonial slavery abroad. It is still the
case today. The dominant powers go to great lengths, including deception, to ensure that their population is compliant in the policies they
want to carry out at home and abroad. Yet they become impatient with
foreign governments that refuse to circumvent the wishes of their people and thereby decline to do the bidding of the West. The neocolonial
framework cannot be the foundation or even the cornerstone of
African unity. Only a consistent anti-neocolonialism and a people-driven democracy can form such a foundation. In fact, such a people-driven democracy may be at odds with representative democracy, which
often means people are passive viewers as their representatives in parliament exercise power on their behalf.
In the exercise of democracy, Africa may once again want to learn a
few lessons from its own pre-colonial institutions. The two dominant
types of societies in Africa, the one without a centralized authority and
the other with a centralized authority vested in the chief, both
assumed forms of participatory democracy. Jomo Kenyatta, in his
book Facing Mount Kenya, describes such a participatory process
among the Agikuyu of Kenya. What is striking in the picture he draws
is the practice of self-organization at all levels of society. Even young
people had their own councils and thus learned leadership as part of
their everyday life. This is in stark contrast to the practices of the colonial and postcolonial state that see organized people as enemies of the
state. How many times have we seen youth organizations banned,
with police chasing them down the streets of major towns? A combination of participatory and representative democratic practices may well
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be what Africa needs as the means of realizing and exercising dreams
of creative African unity.
But even before a political union, Africa has to start the process of
economic and communications integration, and create an All-Africa
common market. The models are already there, the best being the East
African Community, which once saw Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania
share a whole host of services, including a common currency (before a
colonized nation-statism gleefully broke it). But such a common market can only endure if it rises to the level of a political union. A continental political unity will further speed up economic integration. The
consequent economically and politically united Africa will also be in a
better position to engage the other forces in the world in the struggle
for a more just global community. Whatever the path toward a continental identity, it calls for a serious questioning and rejection of the
sanctity of colonial boundaries.
This is nothing short of a call for the decolonization of our
economies, politics, and cultures, in order to create a new beginning
for Africa. Even this will not be smooth sailing. The forces of global
reaction will still try to divide and dominate. But Africa has to meet
this reaction with proaction for the sake of its own being in a rapidly
globalizing world.
Some cynics, schooled in self-doubt, will see a dream for the impossible in such a call. But dreams have always drawn images of the ideally possible. In imagination we draw outlines of a future, then try to
realize it. In days when a few humans started conceiving of flying,
they were dubbed dreamers, not realists. But they continued dreaming
and trying. During plantation slavery, those who talked of freedom
were seen as mere dreamers. But they did not stop dreaming and trying to realize the goal. It is the same for dreamers of the anti-colonial
resistance, who continued to imagine victory and work toward it. Our
present day world owes a lot to those who dared to dream.
For a long time now, I have advocated moving the center from a
handful of European nations to marginalized nations, and then creating conditions for a healthy dialogue and equal exchange among them
all. Although this has been couched in mainly linguistic and cultural
terms, my concerns embrace the wholeness of a community — the economic, political, cultural, and psychic. I see all these as the interrelated
complexity we call human societies. As opposed to the current forms
of globalization that often mean the appropriation of all the other centers and their resources by one “supercenter,” I hope that the ongoing
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struggle intensifies for a global alliance of equal centers. I look forward
to the day when the margin becomes the center and the center becomes
the margin in a dance of continuous reciprocity, because both will be
contributing and drawing equally from their common human center.
嘷
䢇

Notes
1. Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), pp. 476 – 477.
2. Ibid., p. 474.
3. GATT mutated into the WTO in 1994.
4. For Margaret Thatcher’s “There is No Alternative (TINA),” see James H. Mittleman,
“Alternative Globalization,” in Civilizing Globalization, ed. Richard Sandbrook (New
York: State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 237.
5. See Dr. Eunice Njeri Sahle, “Democratisation in Malawi: State, Economic Structure
and Neo-Liberal Hegemony,” (Ph. D. diss., Queen’s University, Canada, 2001), in which
she documents the pressure on Banda to yield to the new conditions. The same is true for
Moi of Kenya.
6. I have dramatized this in my forthcoming novel, Murogi wa Kagogo (Wizard of the Crow,
English translation).
7. The U.S.A. and Canada, for instance, heavily subsidize their agricultural and steel sectors but seethe in fury and demand that the WTO pass judgment on others that follow
suit.
8. What characterized the 19th-century colonial expansion of capitalism — its scramble
for colonies and the ceding of territories to companies like the Imperial East African
Company—was paralleled by the rise and expansion of missionary societies, which also
carved spaces among themselves, even within the same colonial territory. Though
clearly part of the same colonial enterprise, and assuming protection from the colonial
state, they also stood as if they were in competition with the state. The missionary societies provided many social services, including education and medicine. Mongo Beti’s
The Poor Christ of Bomba dramatizes this sibling rivalry between the missionary and the
colonial administrator. Foreign NGOs are similarly allocating spaces to themselves and
posing as if they are on the side of the people against both the postcolonial state and
their financial sponsor, the foreign state.
9. It could be said that the only true NGOs are those in the postcolonial state because
those in the West are often subdivisions of the foreign policies of their governments.
10. For more on this, see these seminal documentary films, “The Global Assembly Line”
and “Life and Debt.”
11. Dr. Eunice Njeri Sahle shows how different varieties of authoritarianism were
encouraged as a more reliable partner in the Cold War postcolonial state. See her unpublished dissertation, “Democratisation in Malawi: State, Economic Structure and Neo-Liberal Hegemony.”
12. Note the celebrated meeting between Reagan and the Mujahedin, during which he
called them “freedom fighters.”
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13. For data, see Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Nelson, 1965).
14. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press), p. 152.
15. Chinua Achebe’s novel Anthills of the Savannah (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1988)
shows and dramatizes what is true of the postcolonial situation in Africa as a whole: the
fact that the military man and his intellectual collaborators as well as opponents are
often products of the same schools and colleges.
16. Frantz Fanon, p. 153.
17. Ibid., p. 150.
18. See Karl Polanyi’s discussion of the Enclosure Movement in The Great Transformation
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, 1957).
19. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, Trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
20. Frantz Fanon, p. 150.
21. Ibid. Fanon is talking about the retreat of the middle class as a whole into what he
describes as “the shocking ways . . . of a traditional bourgeoisie.”
22. (1) African languages must take on the duty, the responsibility and the challenge of
speaking for the continent. (2) The vitality and equality of African languages must be
recognized as a basis for the future empowerment of African peoples. (3) The diversity
of African languages reflects the rich cultural heritage of Africa and must be used as an
instrument of African unity. (4) Dialogue among African languages is essential: African
languages must use the instrument of translation to advance communication among all
people, including the disabled. (5) All African children have the inalienable right to
attend school and learn in their mother tongues. Every effort should be made to develop
African languages at all levels of education. (6) Promoting research on African languages
is vital for their development, while the advancement of African research and documentation will be best served by the use of African languages. (7) The effective and rapid
development of science and technology in Africa depends on the use of African languages and modern technology must be used for the development of African languages.
(8) Democracy is essential for the equal development of African languages, and African
languages are vital for the development of democracy based on equality and social justice. (9) African languages, like all languages, contain gender bias. The role of African
languages in development must overcome this gender bias and achieve gender equality.
(10) African languages are essential for the decolonization of African minds and for the
African Renaissance.
23. Cheikh Anta Diop, “When Can We Talk of an African Renaissance,” Le Musée
(November 1948) and now reissued in Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in African
Culture and Development 1946 – 1960, Trans. Egbuna P. Modum (London: Karnak House,
1996), p. 37.
24. See, for instance, David A. McDonald and Eunice Njeri Salhe, The Legacy of Julius
Nyerere (Trenton: African World Press, 2000).
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